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 Iran's unimpressive economic performance came 
about as a result of the Iran-Iraq War and the inevitable 
collapse of oil prices, both of which were beyond the 
government’s control, in combination with economic 
sanctions and many self-inflicted and self-destructive 
policies.  Foremost among the self-inflicted and self-
destructive wounds is the insecurity of individual citizens, 
human rights violations; the faltering private investment, is 
lack of uniformity in the application of the laws of the land 
and uncertainty due to political instability, corruption, and 
low exports and imports (total trade) relative to the world 
total trade.  
 
Introduction  
 
 Since the Revolution of 1979, many obstacles, 
both internal and external, have hindered the stability and 
growth of Iran’s economy.  While impediments to economic 
recovery and prosperity accompany revolutions in general 
(such as those which occurred in Russia, Algeria and Cuba, 
for example), they typically emerge with a uniqueness that 
reflect the constellation and culmination of political, 
demographic, social, and economic factors specific to that 
country at the time. 
 The case of Iran presents a prime example of how 
the sometimes self-inflicted internal and external economic 
and political conditions have impeded its attempts to 
emerge from the seemingly chaotic state of economic and 
political affairs.  It experiences internal rebellion and 
external sanctions and aggression as it attempts to achieve 
economic and political independence within the current 
global political economy. Taken separately, each of the 
many hurdles to Iran’s economic recovery would be 
somewhat daunting; taken together, they are formidable.  
Included among the major external factors are the Eight 
Year War between Iran and Iraq; a limited economic 
embargo placed upon Iran by the United States; deprivation 
of Iran from international credit market; inaccessibility to 
what are considered dual use technologies; massive 
immigration of refugees from Iraq and Afghanistan; massive 
outward immigration of upper echelon of Iranians in 
businesses and universities; confiscation and nationalization 
of properties; nationalization of banks and establishment of 
Islamic banking in 1983-84; monetization of the 
government deficits; a foreign exchange rate regime 
characterized by too many new initiatives and policy 
reversals during the first two and half decades; sudden and 
frequent economic policy reversals in general; absence of 
the uniform application of laws and regulations; widespread 
corruption; rampant throughout the country; and dwindling 
international trade (exports and imports) as a percentage of 
world trade. 
 This paper intends to set forth an empirical 
evaluation of Iran’s economic performance and 
development in post-Revolution Iran. In what follows 
various socioeconomic indicators will be presented and 
discussed.    
 
Empirical Evidence 
 
Production (GDP):  
 After the revolution, during a period spanning 
approximately ten years, the production of goods and 
services in real terms fell as long as the Iran-Iraq War 
continued.  After the Iran-Iraq war, in 1988 production 
started upward.  This upward trend was enough to change 
the direction of per capital GDP upward, which, except for 
the years 1993-4, has continued to-date.  In 2006-7, the real 
per capita income of Iran reached its pre-Revolution level.   
 One could identify several factors leading to the 
decline in income.  One obvious factor, justifiably, was the 
country’s preoccupation with its war efforts.  Another 
reason for the economy’s lackluster performance was the 
collapse of oil prices in the mid-1980s.1  Iran’s oil revenues 
took a tumble and fell to $9.673 billion in 1988, 
significantly reducing the country’s purchasing power and 
mitigating Iran’s plans for potential development and 
reconstruction of war torn areas. Low and declining private 
and public investments are beyond disputes as a 
contributing factor to low income.  Marginalization of Iran 
in international trade and haphazard monetary policies that 
change with the political wind are shown to be other major 
determining factors in low growth and overall GDP.2
 In rationalizing the low GDP, there are those who 
believe that the officially reported GDP is only a part of the 
total actual real GDP. That is, some believe that a large part 
of Iranian economy is not included in reported data.   
 
 Even though one cannot deny the existence of this 
unofficial underground economy, it cannot be shown that 
they are not included in the official data reported by the 
Central Bank of Iran.  There are two econometric studies on 
this topic: one by Zangeneh and the other by Taiebnia and 
Mohammadi.  Zangeneh found almost no evidence in the 
post-Revolutionary period and a sizable amount in the pre-
  
Revolutionary period, while Taiebnia and Mohammadi 
found the underground economy is, at most, about 15% of 
the official economy.  Therefore, we can safely assume that, 
by all approximations, the official data to be a good 
representative of Iranian economy and the proposition of 
much larger economy due to the existence of a large 
unreported underground economy is, more or less, an 
exaggeration. The existence of a large underground 
economy found by Zangeneh for the pre-Revolutionary 
period, however, makes the fall in the GDP and therefore, 
cost of the revolution much larger than what has been 
estimated. 
 Looking at the country’s per capita consumption 
(graph 2) would convey a similar understanding of the 
economy’s state.  As of 2008-9, Iran’s per capita 
consumption has not caught up with its pre-Revolutionary 
levels.  Per capita consumption dipped to lower levels 
immediately after the Revolution.  However, it recovered 
fairly quickly in 1982-3 to its pre-Revolutionary levels.  But 
the recovery did not last and started to fall again along with 
the devastating war with Iraq.  The downward spiral 
continued until 1993.  The per capita consumption fell from 
and index of 128.88 to 73.1, a drop of 43.2%.  The recovery 
and growth of per capita consumption, except for the years 
1999 and 2000, have been positive ever since.  But, despite 
almost a decade and half of improvements, as of this year, 
1388 (2009), it has not caught up with the pre-Revolution 
levels, yet. 
 
Investment: 
   The investment picture of post-revolutionary 
years has not been promising.  The limited rate of 
investment explains the slow growth rate of the GDP.  The 
low investment rate has not been limited to the private 
sector, but also has been characteristic of the Iranian 
government.  Both public and private sectors have been 
investing increasingly lower percentages of the GDP in 
construction and machinery every year.  These figures are 
low by any standard, whether they are those of industrially 
advanced countries or of newly industrialized countries.  
Investments on the part of both the private and government 
sectors have been higher in the area of construction relative 
to the resources going toward machinery.  
These low levels of investment have alarming 
implications for the country’s industrial capacity to maintain 
and expand production as well as to contain inflation.  
There is no doubt that these levels will not lead to an 
appreciably higher standard of living or to the prospect of a 
high enough growth rate for the economy to absorb current 
open and disguised unemployment as well as the estimated 
one million new entrants into the job market every year in 
the immediate future.   
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 The question then becomes, why such a low 
investment?  The answer is the same.  When there is 
uncertainty, there is limited or no investment in long-term 
projects.  People will invest only in very liquid businesses 
so that they can cash in their holdings on short notice to 
avoid being caught with their wealth tied down in illiquid 
assets.  Uncertainty due to  diminish the willingness of 
  
investors and frighten potential long-term investors; hence 
flight of capital to a social factors such as unrest, 
lawlessness, and lack of a protective civil society safe haven 
and avoidance of long term commitment to any investment 
strategy. 
 
Inflation: 
 Table 1 shows annual inflation rates grouped into 
different time periods.  The first grouping covers the early 
years before the oil price rise.  The second time period 
includes the years after the oil price increase and up to the 
revolution.  The third period covers the post-revolutionary 
years most of which were taken up by the Iran-Iraq War.  
The fourth period reflects the post-war and ‘post Khomeini’ 
era, Rafsanjani’s Presidency.  The next three groups belong 
to Khatami and Ahmadinejad’s Presidency years.  
 As Table 1 shows, prior to the 1970s and before 
the oil price rise, inflation in Iran was rather tame, with an 
average rate approximating 3.87% per year.  However, this 
does not hold true for the subsequent time periods.  
 Budgetary constraints became almost irrelevant to 
Iran’s economic planning, at least for a short-while, when 
huge oil revenues earned due to the spiraling oil prices 
triggered by the Arab oil embargo in 1973 against the West.  
Prior to 1973, the availability of foreign exchange dictated 
the government’s project selection, and therefore, imported 
inflation was not a problem.3
 In pursuit of rapid economic development, the 
government, on one hand, used the oil revenues to finance 
almost all of the old and new projects.  This contributed to 
an increase in the monetary base and money supply 
(discussed below), and therefore in aggregate demand.  On 
the other hand, due to the limited capacity, the higher 
aggregate demand could not be satisfied internally, hence, 
goods had to be ordered from abroad.  Due to the universal 
inflationary situation of the 1970s, all of the ordered 
materials carried with them an inflationary premium.  
Regardless of this, however, the open door policy was 
ineffective because of the inability of importers to bring 
their merchandise into the country due to inadequate port 
and transportation facilities.  There was a waiting period of 
over six months for ships to unload their cargo in the port 
cities of the Persian Gulf.  And when they did unload, they 
were unable to transfer the merchandise to its final 
destination.  Since there were no storage facilities, the 
imported goods could not be safely stored in these port 
cities.  As a result, the imported items were stored in open 
facilities located around the outskirts of the port cities, a 
practice which resulted in their ruin.  Therefore, the 
inflationary pressure could not be eased by a greater volume 
of imports. 
  The tremendous increase in 
the price of oil gave the government an opportunity to 
engage in grandiose nation-wide projects that were beyond 
the absorption capacity of the country.  Iran’s infrastructure 
was too limited to accommodate these new projects, and 
inflationary pressure started to mount.   
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Graph 4: Rate of Growth in Money 
Supply (M2) and Inflation rates
 Another factor contributing to the inflationary 
build-up prior to the Revolution was the higher per-capita 
  
income.  As purchasing power trickled down to the masses, 
demand for goods and services increased, which in turn 
increased the intensity of inflation.  Pre-Revolutionary Iran 
provided a classic example of a country in which there were 
too many dollars chasing too few goods. 
 
Table 1: Inflation Rates              
Years explanation Average 
1973 – 1979 before the oil price increase   3.87 
1973 – 1979 before the Revolution     13.81 
1980 – 1988 the Iran-Iraq War period 19.58 
1989 – 1997 Rafsanjani Years 24.62 
1998 – 2005 Khatami Years    15.34 
2006 – 2008 Ahmadinejad Years 18.23 
2009 Ahmadinejad Year 10.80 
  
 The sudden rise in inflation immediately after the 
jump in oil prices jolted the economic system because 
people were not used to that magnitude of instability.  
However, the years following the Revolution were not any 
better.  Although inflation rates reported by official sources 
are high, unofficial anecdotal estimates are at much higher 
levels.  One must be cognizant of the fact that the official 
estimates include all of the prices that are controlled by the 
government directly or through its agencies, companies, and 
bonyads (religious foundations).  These goods and services, 
such as electricity, water, bread, tobacco and tobacco 
products, tea and sugar, are subject to government 
mandated price controls and subsidies.  Since the controlled 
prices of these commodities are combined with the prices of 
other free market goods, it results in much more moderate 
official inflation rates.  This implies the existence of a 
serious hidden inflationary bias, which will show itself 
when these controls and subsidies are removed in the 
current year, 2010.  
 
Subsidies and Inflation outlook: 
  In the last couple of years, the Central Bank has 
been controlling the rate of money supply and therefore the 
economy experienced a rather sharp reduction in the rate of 
inflation (see table 1).  But the outlook for inflation in the 
coming years might not be encouraging because of the 
change in policies of the government.   
 Early in 2010 (in the last months of Iranian year 
1388), the Parliament passed a law eliminating subsidies on 
16 basic staples and allocated $20 billions (this figure could 
be raised to $40 billions if a new agreement is reached and 
the law is modified as President Ahmadinejad has been 
insisting upon) for direct cash payments to the public 
instead.  According to this law all subsidies on gas, diesel, 
natural gas, electricity, water, wheat, flour, rice, milk, sugar, 
cooking oils, aviation, rail, and postal services will be 
eliminated.   
 The overall intentions of this law, enunciated by 
the regime, are: reform consumption patterns and reduce 
excessive consumption, especially energy consumption by 
raising their prices to world levels; redistribution of income 
in favor of the lower economic classes; reduction of 
subsidies and allocation of saved resources to improving 
economics infrastructure; removing subsidy generated 
distortions and allowing allocation of resources to the best 
uses through market mechanism. 
 Potential negative consequences of this law are: 
increased cost of exportables and therefore reduction in 
non-oil exports.  This might be compensated somewhat by 
the falling value of the Iranian Rial.  But the falling value of 
Ir. Rial would contribute further to the inflation rate by 
causing imports prices to go up more; increase in inflation 
rates.  The Parliament is expecting an increase of 35% and 
the Central Bank is expecting an increase of 15%, while 
independent economists have predicted a 35 to 40 percent 
in inflation rate in addition to the current 10% rate; severe 
change in income distribution from have-nots to haves.   
 According to the current scheme, a family is 
expected to receive 50,000 toman as cash subsidy. 
Assuming a 35% inflation rate, the cash subsidy would 
compensate a loss of purchasing power of those with 
income of 142857 toman.  So, 50,000 is enough 
compensation for a family earning 142,857 toman to stay on 
even-keel. Any income higher that that necessarily means, 
other things constant, loss of purchasing power in favor of 
the government and those who are not wage earners, i.e. 
producers and merchants.  Given the fact that 142,857 
toman incomes is even below the lowest of the low income 
workers, this implies that all wage earners who are not in a 
position to bargain for higher wages to compensate for 
purchasing power losses would lose. 
 
Table 2: inflation and Purchasing Power 
money 
income 
Purchasing  
Power (PP) 
35% inflation 
PP plus 
subsidy 
50,000 
Loss of  
PP 
 
142,857 92,857 142,857 0 
  200,000 130,000 180,000 -20,000 
300,000 195,000 245,000 -50,000 
500,000 325,000 375,000 -125,000 
  
 The worst outcome of this law and its unintended 
consequences could be a redistribution of income of great 
magnitudes from have-nots to haves.  As table 2 shows, the 
higher the wages, other things remaining the same, the 
higher are the losses of purchasing powers of different 
income groups.  Also, given the low elasticity of demand for 
most of these necessities,4 total expenditures (revenues) on 
these products are going to increase.  These losses of 
purchasing power are going to go to the producers, 
merchants, and the government, which imply sever a 
  
redistribution of income for the worse; income 
redistribution from have-nots to haves. That necessarily 
means a greater inequality and eventually a change in 
standard of living of lower income echelon of the 
population.  
 A simple outcome of this in the short run is going 
to be change in the composition of consumption baskets of 
lower income classes.  That is, they would necessarily cut or 
modify their expenditures on what they might consider 
“marginal” such as food, healthcare, education, and leisure.  
However, in the medium and long run, this could add to and 
enlarge the size of the impoverished lower income classes.   
That is, in the medium and long run, these cuts will deprive 
them of the opportunity of moving to a higher class through 
better education.  In other words, many more could fall in 
the vicious circle of poverty-low education-low paying jobs-
poverty. 
 The other side of the story of this law is a 
recessionary environment.  It could create stagflation. On 
the one hand, removal of these subsidies would increase 
cost to producers and merchants, who would pass them 
along to consumers.  It increases the cost of energy from 
$9.8 to $49.00.  This would shift the aggregate supply curve 
up and to the left (see figure 1).  
 On the other hand, the cash subsidies are going to 
increase aggregate demand.  This would shift aggregate 
demand up to the right.  
 Depending on the strengths of these changes, 
output could increase, decrease, or stay the same but prices 
would definitely rise.    
 According to the IMF estimates, the new subsidy 
law would lead to a jump in the consumer prices by about 
33% in the first year (1389; 2010) and, if proper monetary 
and fiscal policies are undertaken, “the inflation would 
gradually subside thereafter.” 5
  So, the question that remains to be answered is:  
what has been the main culprit(s) in causing price instability 
in Iran?  Already mentioned within this paper have been 
various contributing factors, such as inadequate investment, 
decline in real per capita output, excessive population 
growth, urban migration, influx of international refugees, 
and the Iran-Iraq War. While these conditions have had 
significant direct and indirect impact upon the problem, all 
of them taken together could not have sustained inflation at 
such high rates, without monetary accommodations. 
 In the same report, the IMF 
predicts a slow down of the economy to a sluggish growth 
of under 2% for the first year (2010) and, with proper mix 
of fiscal and monetary policies, to 6.5%-7.5% growth in the 
medium run. 
 
Money supply growth: 
   Starting in 1387 (2008), a serious change in 
monetary policy took place.  All measure of monetary 
aggregates, except for the monetary base turned around and 
a much tighter monetary policy was pursued, which resulted 
in sharp drop in rate of growth in money supply, M2.   
 Graph 4 shows the tight association of money 
growth rates (M2) and inflation rates.  As it is clear, the 
recent fall in the inflation rate to 10.8% in 2009 is in line 
with the decrease in the rate of increase in the money 
supply, as expected. 
 
Iran's Trade in the Post Revolution Era: 
  Despite the post-Revolutionary rhetoric, it seems 
that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been less than 
successful in advancing the countries interests in 
international arena.  The seeming failure of the country in 
international trade could be, at least partially, a result of 
domestic policies.  But a large extent of it could be 
attributed to the US sanctions and unfavorable treatments by 
the industrialized countries.  Whatever the reason, there has 
been a considerable shift in Iranian trade away from 
developed countries and in favor of other LDCs.6 However, 
Iran's overall trade in general and exports in particular, have 
not kept pace with the rest of world, in absolute as well as in 
relative terms.   
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Figure 1 
  
 Total exports fell to a low level of US $8.15 billion 
in 1988 and ever since, have inched upward and, in recent 
years, have surpassed their pre-1977 levels.  However, due 
to the many fold increases in world trade (both imports and 
exports) Iran's share in world trade woefully declined to 
negligible level of .002% of world trade in 1998. But in the 
last few years, it has more than doubled to about .005%, 
which is still negligible for a country as rich as Iran. 
 
Non-Oil Exports: 
  In 1356 (1977) non-oil exports totaled $563 
million. In 1353 (1974), the ratio of non-oil exports to total 
imports was at 9%.  Even though this low ratio is 
understandable in the face of a sharp rise in imports due to a 
large increase in oil revenues, it never recovered to any 
significant degree until later in the 1990s, when draconian 
import restrictions were imposed. Decline in the ratio of 
non-oil exports to total imports was at its worst throughout 
most of the post-Revolutionary era (see Graph 6). 
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 For five years in a row, 1360-4 (1981-5), the ratios 
of non-oil exports to total imports fell to about 2 percent.  
  
This situation is not surprising given the Iran-Iraq War, 
which caused much destruction and required the 
reallocation of resources to the war efforts.  As graph 
shows, there is substantial increase in the ability of the 
country to pay for its imports with non-oil exports.  The 
ratio increased to 38% in 1373 (1994) but fell back to a 
little over 21% by 1997.  However, this was mostly artificial 
and due to "the impact of an increasingly appreciated 
exchange rate, a weaker demand for Iranian products in 
some export markets, and anti-export bias in policy.  In 
particular, the single largest component of non-oil exports - 
carpets - declined markedly to US$600 by 1996/97, 
compared with US$2.1 billion in 1994/95."7
  
  In any way, 
the ratios of non-oil exports have improved in 2000s, which 
should be a good omen for the future of the country.   
 However, this improved position could well be 
destroyed overnight if the  value of the Iranian Rial is not 
allowed to fall at least proportionally with the inflation.  
The higher cost of energy and probably other inputs are 
going to increase exportables prices and decrease their 
competitiveness in the international market.  Therefore, 
Iran’s non-oil exports could suffer as a result 
 
Observations and Conclusions 
  
 Iran's unimpressive economic performance came 
about as a result of the Iran-Iraq War and the inevitable 
collapse of oil prices, both of which were beyond the 
government’s control, in combination with economic 
sanctions and many self-inflicted and self-destructive 
policies.  Many of the negative economic conditions could 
easily be reversed if Iran’s ideological straight jacket were 
removed from the policy making process.   
 Foremost among the self-inflicted and self-
destructive wounds is the insecurity of individual citizens.  
Human rights violations are repeatedly acknowledged by 
officials of the United Nations and independent researchers, 
and are highlighted by the media with a troublesome 
frequency.  One could refer to the student unrest the arrests 
and, imprisonment of prominent figures, as well as, and 
serial killings during the 1997-99, and most recently, the 
continuing arrests, tortures, and even execution of the those 
who participated or connected to the 2009 presidential 
election disputes.8
 Thirdly, one might not be able to depend, with 
certainty, on the laws of the land as the guiding principles.  
These laws may or may not stand the test of time; may be 
dismissed as un-Islamic or against the interest of Islam.    It 
contributes to the sense of uncertainty about laws and 
regulations that is felt by potential foreign and domestic 
investors.
  Second, the ease and frequency with 
which laws and regulations are revoked and modified.  It 
seems that when a law or regulation does produce instant 
results, it is changed.    
9
 A fourth related problem, which would explain the 
faltering private investment, is lack of uniformity in the 
application of the laws of the land and uncertainty due to 
political instability, and the sense of individual insecurity 
which these conditions instill.  Court decisions as well as 
other official rulings depend on who you are, where you are, 
and with whom you are acquainted.  In Iran, individual 
government officials could and would interpret the law to 
suit the person and not the situation.  In Iran, as is 
notoriously known, nothing is impossible if you know the 
proper authorities and have the monetary ability to buy their 
favors.  Iran is the 16the from the bottom of the list of 
countries in terms of corruption.   
   
 Fifth, since the revolution Iran has been paying for 
its political leanings in other less quantifiable ways. One 
punitive method, promoted by the United States, is the 
unwritten and circuitous international prohibition of the 
transfer of technology, which might be considered as 
capable of serving dual purposes by the United States.  
Even though, on the surface, other countries do not directly 
subscribe to and participate in this prohibition, they have 
conducted business with Iran with a watchful eye on these 
transactions.  This means that Iran cannot openly buy what 
it needs without a great deal of European and Japanese 
governmental red tapes. They do not want to be accused of 
supporting or arming a “rogue” nation, therefore, they have 
been making it increasingly more difficult and costly to buy 
state of the arts machinery and equipments.  The second 
way that Iran is penalized by the “dual containment policy” 
is in the financial markets, where Iran’s credit rating is far 
lower than what a country like Iran should receive.  There is 
not even one instance in which Iran has failed to pay its 
debt, even during those chaotic days of the hostage crisis 
and frozen Iranian assets.  Yet, Iran must pay higher interest 
rates due to, among other things, low credit ratings and high 
country risk.  Other examples abound.  Iran has not been 
able to buy oil technology in a competitive way.  Third, the 
“dual containment” strategy keeps foreign investors away.  
Even though Iran has been trying to lure businesses to 
invest in the country proper or in the Free Trade Zone areas, 
the attempts have been less than successful.10
 It is well established that Iran is a marginal country 
in exports and imports (total trade) relative to the world 
total trade. But her absence from international arenas denies 
her a forum to defend and protect her interests.  It is also 
important to be reminded of the impact of openness on the 
economy.  Openness imposes the tyranny of the global 
market.  The country is no longer allowed to plunder its 
scarce resources in the production of commodities that do 
not have clear international comparative advantage. 
International competition forces each country to be much 
more judicious and a great deal less cavalier in its choices 
of what and how much to produce. 
    
  
Finally, from the discussion of output (GDP), 
faltering investment in machinery and construction, and 
spiraling inflation except in a few years, it is apparent that 
monetary policy has not been effective in stimulating real 
economic activities, nor has it been used successfully to 
control the value of the currency.  It has been employed in 
an on-again-off-again manner rather than as a tool for 
proactive decision making.  If this undesirable tendency (to 
use monetary policy in the regulation of short-run ups and 
downs) were to be overcome, it would require three 
initiatives.  First and foremost, the Central Bank must be 
given independence and the authority to make monetary 
policy without regard to politics.  When the Central Bank is 
unencumbered by political considerations, the short run 
vacillation in its monetary decisions would be eliminated or 
considerably mitigated. Second, given the limited usefulness 
of monetary policy in directing and influencing the real 
variables of the economy such as real output, and 
employment in the long run, the Central Bank must be 
directed to strive to achieve the one and only objective over 
which it has much control -- price stability.  This would 
enable the Central Bank to focus its resources and power 
upon a realistic and feasible outcome.  Third, the Central 
Bank must adhere to a set of explicitly and publicly 
announced quantitative targets for inflation, and also, to a 
set of rules designed to achieve those quantitative targets.  
These would go far in cooling the speculative minds of the 
bazaaris who would no longer profit from hoarding and 
from speculation about the future higher prices.  And, 
arguably most importantly, these changes would promote a 
considerable reduction in uncertainty, a problem that has 
been pervasive and harmful to the economy in the post-
revolutionary Iran.11
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Analysis, vol. 15, no. 2, November 1999. 
9   See Hamid Zangeneh, “The Iranian Economy and the 
Globalization Process.” 
10  See, Hamid Zangeneh (1997). International Trade in 
Iran: An Appraisal.  Research in Middle East 
Economics, Vol. 2,. 
11  For a discussion of rules vs. discretion see Zangeneh, 
Hamid, “Saving, Investment and Growth: A Causality 
Test.” 
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